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Abstract
The capture of Saddam Hussein alive is of course a cause for rejoicing. His crimes were
massive. He left hundreds of thousands of victims in Iraq; the Shiites who dared to oppose him,
the Kurds against whom he committed a most terrible genocide. The question now and the subject
of this talk is what to do in order to bring him justice. Having captured him and some of his
chief lieutenants, how should they be brought to justice? Broadly speaking, there are four options.
The first is a wholly domestic trial in Baghdad before Iraqi judges. The second option would
be a hybrid international/domestic court of the form that is now operating in Sierra Leone. The
third option is a treaty-based multinational court. The fourth and final option would be an ad hoc
tribunal established by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, on
the lines of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Those
then are the four options.
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Justice Richard Goldstone**
Good evening and thank you very much for that very warm
introduction on a very cold evening. I am also surprised at how
many of you braved the weather, or will still be braving the
weather, to be here this evening.
The capture of Saddam Hussein alive is of course a cause
for rejoicing. His crimes were massive. He left hundreds of
thousands of victims in Iraq; the Shiites who dared to oppose
him, the Kurds against whom he committed a most terrible ge-
nocide. The question now and the subject of this talk is what to
do in order to bring him justice. Having captured him and some
of his chief lieutenants, how should they be brought to justice?
Broadly speaking, there are four options. The first is a
wholly domestic trial in Baghdad before Iraqi judges. Such a
trial could also conceivably be held outside Iraq in consequence
of a treaty or by the exercise of universal jurisdiction. That may,
in the case of countries in the Middle East, require special do-
mestic legislation, but from a jurisprudential point of view it is a
* This Article was originally given as a lecture entitled Justice in Iraq: the Trial of
Saddam Hussein at the Fordham University School of Law on Thursday,January 15, 2004
for the Crowley Program in International Human Rights at Fordham Law School.
** Justice Richard Goldstone was appointed Judge of the Transvaal Supreme
Court in 1980, where he served until his appointment to the Appellate Division of the
South African Supreme Court in 1989. From 1991-1994, he chaired the Commission of
Inquiry regarding Public Violence and Intimidation (the Goldstone Commission) to
investigate apartheid-era violence. He was appointed to the Constitutional Court of
South Africa in 1994. From 1994-1996, he served as Chief Prosecutor of the United
Nations International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In
December 2001, he was appointed by the International Bar Association to chair the
International Task Force on Terrorism. He will hold the William Hughes Mulligan
Chair in International Legal Studies at Fordham Law School in the fall 2004 semester.
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possibility. I do not believe it to be a practical one at this point,
but it should not be left out of account.
The second option would be a hybrid international/domes-
tic court of the form that is now operating in Sierra Leone.'
That court has sometimes incorrectly been referred to as an "in-
ternational court." It is not. It is a domestic Sierra Leonean
court with international involvement through an agreement be-
tween Sierra Leone and the United Nations. Similarly, in Ko-
sovo, there are now domestic courts staffed by increasing num-
bers of international judges and international prosecutors. I will
return to what is rather a sorry story with regard to the Kosovo
courts.
The third option is a treaty-based multinational court. The
Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal was such a court. Again, it is
incorrect to refer to Nuremberg as an "international court."
The four victorious powers "pooled" their respective domestic
jurisdictions.2 The four powers decided that they would do to-
gether what they otherwise could do on their own. Each of
those powers obviously had the right under international and
military law to put Nazi leaders on trial in their own courts. In
the Japanese tribunal there were more than the four countries,
but it was nevertheless a pooling of domestic jurisdictions.
I would mention that that the new International Criminal
Court is similarly constituted. It is a pooling of the domestic ju-
risdictions of the ninety-two countries that have thus far ratified
the Rome Treaty.' In effect, they have decided that alleged war
criminals they could put on trial in their own courts, they are
happy to send for trial to the International Criminal Court. I
would mention in passing that the objection of the United States
that the International Criminal Court is somehow something
new and contrary to international law is simply wrong in my view.
If an American citizen commits an offense in my country, South
Africa, the courts of South Africa can put that person on trial.
Similarly, if I commit an offense this evening in Manhattan, I am
1. Agreement Between the United States and the Government of Sierra Leone on
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Aug. 14, 2000, U.S.-Sierra Leone.
2. Charter of the International Military Tribunal in Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agree-
ment), Aug. 8, 1945.
3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. IV [herein-
after Rome Statute].
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amenable to the criminal jurisdiction of the appropriate Ameri-
can court. The ICC is a pooling of such jurisdictions.
The Lockerbie trial is an unusual illustration of a treaty-
based multinational court. The treaty between the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Libya provided for the Libyan
accused appearing before a Scottish court sitting in the Nether-
lands.4 Jurisdiction was exercised under that treaty.
The fourth and final option would be an ad hoc tribunal
established by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter,5 on the lines of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Those
then are the four options.
The International Criminal Court is not an option as it does
not have jurisdiction in respect of offenses committed prior to
the July 1, 2002.6 Moreover, neither Iraq nor any other relevant
country has ratified the Rome Treaty. Therefore, the Interna-
tional Criminal Court would simply not be relevant to the topic
that we are now considering.
Before beginning to answer the difficult and complex issue
of which of the relevant options should be exercised with respect
to Saddam Hussein, it is necessary to reference the history in
order to give context to the discussion. It begins, as all of these
discussions usually do, with Nuremberg. It should be borne in
mind that it was the United States' insistence that led to the deci-
sion to put the Nazi war criminals on trial at all. Winston Churc-
hill wanted to line them up and summarily execute them. Stalin
would have been happy to go along with that. He had, after all,
been doing it for years. The French were ambivalent. It was
Henry Stimson, the then-Secretary of Defense, who convinced
President Truman, who in turn convinced the other leaders of
the victorious Nations, that the Nazi war criminals, notwithstand-
ing the terrible crimes which they had committed, should be
given a "fair" trial, by the standards of those days. The basis, as I
have explained already, was treaty based. The four powers
pooled their jurisdictions.
4. Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Con-
cerning a Scottish Trial in the Netherlands, Sept. 18, 1998, Neth.-U.K., N. Ir., 38 I.L.M.
926, 926-27.
5. U.N. CHARTER art. 39, para. 1.
6. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art XI.
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The judges came from the victorious powers, the Nations of
the victims of the crimes charged. This was, as has frequendy
been alleged, victors' justice. This is one of the negative legacies
of Nuremberg. Then, too, there was certainly no equality of
arms. It was not a fair trial by today's standards and the prosecu-
tion had everything going for it. They had thousands of investi-
gators and the top lawyers from the four countries, whereas the
defendants really had very puny arms in comparison.
I like to add a caveat in voicing these criticisms of Nurem-
berg. It is not really fair to criticize Nuremberg by today's stan-
dards. By the standards of 1945 that there was a trial at all was a
huge step forward. Moreover, it was not that unfair of a trial.
There were acquittals of some of the defendants. I suggest that
one should test the fairness of courts not by their convictions but
by their acquittals. I always feel rather satisfied when there are
acquittals in the Yugoslavia or the Rwanda Tribunal because I
think that is the best indication that the system is working effi-
ciently and fairly. What is important for present purposes is that
the laws applied at Nuremberg have now become customary in-
ternational law. They were unanimously approved and adopted
by the General Assembly in 1948.' The recognition of crimes
against humanity has led to the development of universal juris-
diction in domestic and international courts.
By "universal jurisdiction," I mean a jurisdiction that many
courts now have to put people on trial for the worst possible of-
fenses, regardless of where the crime was committed. Normally,
courts only have jurisdiction over persons who commit crimes
within their territorial jurisdiction. Again, if I commit an offense
in Manhattan, I cannot be put on trial for it in Canada or even in
my own country. For huge war crimes, for genocide, for grave
breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions,8 for violations of
the Torture Conventions,9 and now contraventions of many con-
ventions dealing with terrorism, there is universal jurisdiction
7. G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946).
8. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. XLIX; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. L; Geneva Convention relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12 1949, art. CXXIX; Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art CXLVI.
9. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, Feb. 4, 1984, art. VII.
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conferred upon domestic courts."° People can be put on trial
for those crimes in whatever country they may be apprehended,
regardless of where the crime was actually committed and no
matter how tenuous the connection is between the country ap-
plying universal jurisdiction and the country where the crime
was committed.
The Genocide Convention1" is interesting in this context be-
cause it did not create universal jurisdiction for the worst of
crimes. It provides in express terms that those who commit ge-
nocide "shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the
territory of which the act was committed, or by such interna-
tional penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to
those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdic-
tion."1 2 So the drafters of the Genocide Convention in 1948 as-
sumed, naively as it turned out, that there would soon be an In-
ternational Criminal Court. Unfortunately it took more than
fifty years for that to happen. The Nations that met in Geneva in
1949 at the behest of the International Committee of the Red
Cross were more realistic. They decided that universal jurisdic-
tion should be conferred on domestic courts to try people for
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions."
There was this interregnum between 1948 and 1993 when
the United Nations Security Council established the Yugoslavia
Tribunal. During that period, there were many attempts to set
up an International Criminal Court, but the Cold War in effect
made it impossible. The Soviet Union and China were certainly
not prepared to consider setting up an international court and
the United States also was never eager to push for one. Every
now and then the International Law Commission of the United
Nations was instructed to draft a treaty setting up an Interna-
tional Criminal Court.'4 They did so. The drafts never went very
10. See, e.g., Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, art. 111; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, art. IV; International Convention for the Suppression of Terror-
ist Bombings, Jan. 12, 1998, art. VI; International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, Jan. 10, 2000, art. X.
11. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
12. Genocide Convention, supra note 11, art VI.
13. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
14. See International Law Commission, Conventions and Other Texts, at http://
www.un.org/law/ilc/convents.htm.
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much further than unimportant committees of the United Na-
tions and they ended up gathering dust in some dark archive
either in Geneva or in New York.
It was the awful events in the former Yugoslavia that led the
Security Council, to the surprise of international lawyers and the
international community, to set up the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and in turn, in No-
vember of 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda("ICTR").
Now, there can be no question that had the Rwanda geno-
cide occurred prior to the war crimes committed in the former
Yugoslavia, there would not have been an International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda. There can be no doubt that the major
Western Nations demanded the Yugoslavia Tribunal because the
terrible crimes that were committed, particularly in Bosnia, were
committed in Europe. They were crimes committed by people
with fair skins, and blond hair, and blue eyes in the backyard of
Europe, where it was supposed never to happen again.
In addition the Cold War had come to an end, the Berlin
Wall had come down in 1989, and that too made it easier. Russia
and China were prepared in that window of opportunity to go
along with what became a unanimous resolution of the Security
Council setting up the Yugoslavia Tribunal.15 There was, in addi-
tion, the "CNN factor," as it is called. There were those horrible
photographs broadcast around the world, photographs that re-
minded people in Europe of the Nazi concentration camps in
the Second World War. So all of these factors came together
and resulted in the Security Council, in May 1993, setting up the
Yugoslavia Tribunal.
In April of 1994, in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide,
the new Rwandan Government, which had put an end to the
genocide, requested the Security Council to set up an Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.16 From personal contact
with the Rwandan leaders I was left in no doubt that they wished
for a tribunal very different from that of the former Yugoslavia.
Their country had been destroyed and with it their criminal jus-
tice system. Ninety percent of their judges had been murdered
in the genocide. Over 90% of their prosecutors had been mur-
15. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993).
16. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994).
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dered in the genocide.1 7 What they wanted was an international
court to replace their smashed judicial system. They wanted a
court, sitting in Rwanda, working with their government, putting
on trial the people responsible for the genocide.
The Security Council was not prepared to do that. Let it be
said immediately that it was for good reason. They did not see
how an international criminal court could be established with-
out making it independent. There was no way the European
powers would have agreed to the death penalty. And, if the trials
were to be fair, they could hardly be held in Kigali with hun-
dreds of thousands of people baying for blood. You could not
expect there to have been security for judges who may have ac-
quitted those accused, let alone for the witnesses or the defense
counsel.
I am sometimes asked if this does not have the perverse ef-
fect of giving the fairest trials to the worst offenders and leaving
the low level bureaucrats, who are not shielded from the death
penalty, to the mercy of whatever is left of the domestic court
system.
The problem of the death penalty really had no solution.
President Bizimungu, at our first meeting said to me, "If I was an
abolitionist, if I did not believe in the death penalty, this is
hardly a good time to tell that to my people." He added that he
was not an abolitionist. "Imagine, in the face of a genocide, go-
ing to your people and saying that this is the time we should
abolish the death sentence." He said that he would not have
survived ten minutes as president.
All of this is obviously relevant with regard to trials in Bagh-
dad. In the case of both the Yugoslavia Tribunal and the
Rwanda Tribunal, the Security Council decided that those courts
could not sit in the countries where the crimes were committed
and I have no doubt that that was a correct decision. There was
no way in 1993 or 1994 that the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia could have sat in Sarajevo or Zagreb
or Belgrade. It just would not have been possible. Which of the
three capital cities would one have chosen? Whichever of the
three was chosen would have been completely unacceptable to
17. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Field Operation in
Rwanda, The Administration of Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda, U.N. Doc. HRFOR/
Justice/June 1996/E (1996).
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the other two countries. What sort of security would there have
been for international judges? Who would have staffed them?
There would have been a multiplicity of irresoluble problems
had they gone that route. Similarly with Rwanda, as I have said,
it just would not have been possible to have the trials in Kigali in
the aftermath of the genocide.
There can be no question that criminal trials should ideally
be held where the crimes were committed. It is very important
for courts, especially criminal courts, to be accessible to the vic-
tims, so that the victims can feel part of the process. But that is
not always possible.
We were fortunate in South Africa. The investigations, the
international inquiries by the Commission that I headed for
three years, could be held literally where the crimes were com-
mitted.'" There were really no serious security problems. In
fact, it amazed many international visitors that we had no secur-
ity procedures at all. There were not even metal detectors.
Moreover, the hearings were not in court buildings. We did not
want the people coming there to feel that these inquiries were
still a part of the apartheid system. We used local halls and we
made it as accessible to the public and as public-friendly as possi-
ble. We were lucky that the situation in South Africa enabled
that to be possible.
This was not possible with the Yugoslavia or the Rwanda
Tribunals. So the Yugoslavia Tribunal was put in The Hague, a
long way from the places where the crimes were committed. In
the case of Rwanda, it was a little closer. Arusha in Northern
Tanzania is at least a neighboring country that is not too far as
the crow flies, though it is still rather inaccessible. Oftentimes
the quickest route between Kigali and Arusha was via Brussels or
Amsterdam. This logistical problem was only resolved when the
Norwegian Government generously gave us a charter plane to fly
the twenty or twenty-five minute journey between Arusha and
Kigali.
These problems of distance are serious. I am happy there is
18. In 1991, 1 was appointed to head the Standing Commission of Inquiry Regard-
ing the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, which I believe to this day was
the necessary first step to reconciliation in my home country of South Africa after the
apartheid years. See RICHARD GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY. REFLECTIONS OF A WAR
CRIMES INVESTIGATOR 25-58 (2000). See also ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
1991: THE GOLDSTONE COMISSION 661 (1992).
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a young human rights activist in the audience tonight who in fact
investigated these problems with regard to the Yugoslavia Tribu-
nal. She and a fellow student at Tufts University conducted a
very efficient and useful survey after consulting with many peo-
ple in Bosnia to find out what effect the Yugoslavia Tribunal was
having on them. 9 Their conclusions were not very optimistic.
The victims felt that were far too remote from where the trials
were being held. Their conclusions reinforced the views I held
about the importance of trials being accessible to victims.
It was more serious in Rwanda where the Government did
not like the international tribunal. Having requested the estab-
lishment of the Tribunal, it rejected it because of its remoteness
and the absence of a death penalty. It cast the only negative vote
against the resolution setting it up. To its credit, however, that
Government cooperated with the Prosecutor with regard to in-
vestigations, certainly during my term of office. Remember this
was in the months immediately after this vote by the Security
Council and was probably the most difficult period. The security
of the members of my office and the investigators who had to go
into the field was never a serious problem. I always admired the
Rwandan Government for having cooperated in that way, provid-
ing us with accommodation, with offices, and so forth.
Let me say too at this point that the successes that there
have been (and there have been important successes of both the
Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals) would not have been possible
and neither of those Tribunals would have got off their feet and
become operational but for the assistance of the United States.
It was the Clinton Administration that made it possible and,
again, I speak from personal experience. It was the human and
financial resources to The Hague and Arusha at the expense of
the American people that made it all happen.
One of the consequences of not having the United States
on-board with the International Criminal Court is that this im-
portant assistance will be absent. Many of the defendants who
"voluntarily" came from Croatia would never have come but for
the United States' threats to have World Bank loans withheld.
19. Kristin Cibelli & Tamy Guberek, Justice Unknown, Justice Unsatisfied? Bosnian
NGOs Speak about the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Project of
the Education and Public Inquiry and International Citizenship at Tufts University
2000).
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Milosevic himself would not be on trial in The Hague at the mo-
ment had the United States not threatened to withhold $1.2 bil-
lion of aid. It was that that convinced Prime Minister Djindjic of
Serbia to hand over Milosevic. 2° It was the United States' push
that made a huge difference to those two Tribunals.
The United Nations Tribunals have had important suc-
cesses. The first is they have proved that international courts can
put on fair trials. This was not a given. Many people seriously
doubted whether you could get judges, prosecutors, and lawyers
from all over the world and make such a court work efficiently
and fairly. Could there be new international processes and pro-
cedures that would work? Well, it has. It is now no longer ques-
tioned.
There are really no serious criticisms that I have seen or
read of the fairness of the trials being held in Arusha or The
Hague. There have been criticisms about their length and their
expense. These are problems. There is only one way of putting
on criminal trials, however, and that is to have fair procedures.
If it takes time, there is no alternative. Obviously, one would like
to see shorter trials, but if they are going to be unfair, what is the
point? In my view, either you have fair trials or you do not have
trials at all, and especially so in international courts. That is a
political problem. People who do not like the Tribunals criticize
them for their expense. It should be borne in mind, however,
that the cost of bombing for one week in the Kosovo war would
pay for both Tribunals for a year.2 So expense is a relative issue.
Secondly, the work of the Tribunals put an end to the false
20. See Matthew Kaminski, Serbia Turns Milosevic Over to U.N. Court, WALL ST. J.,
June 29, 2001; Gordon Cramb & Judy Dempsy, Yugoslavia Gets £900m Reward: Handover
of Milosevic Prompts Immediate Pledge from International Conference, FIN. TIMES (LONDON),
June 30, 2001, at 1.
21. For the biennium of 2002-2003, the U.N. General Assembly appropriated
U.S.$262,653,700 to the operations of the ICTY. See Tenth Annual Report of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Vio-
lations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, at 1 332-34, U.N. Doc. A/58/297-S/2003/829 (2003). For the
biennium of 2002-2003, the U.N. General Assembly appropriated U.S.$177,739,400 to
the operations of the ICTR. See also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Gen-
eral Information, available at http://www.ictr.org/. The estimates for the cost of the air
campaign in Operation Allied Force are U.S.$2.3 - 4 billion, which at the low end factor
out to be approximately U.S.$270 million per week. See Total Cost Of Allied Force Air
Campaign: Preliminary Estimate, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Study,
June 10, 1999, available at http://www.csbaonline.org/.
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denials that accompanied the commission of the war crimes. I
remember so well in the cases of both Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
many people denied that genocide or crimes against humanity
were committed. The Bosnian Serb Government in Pale, in par-
ticular, denied that these crimes were being perpetrated. Wher-
ever you get heinous criminality they are invariably accompanied
by denials on the part of the perpetrators. With regard to
Rwanda, I recall visits in my office in The Hague from serious
legal scholars coming from Brussels or Paris coming to explain
to me that genocide did not occur. They said it was a spontane-
ous eruption, tribalism in Africa, and not planned at all. I re-
member, too, that in the early months we were very careful not
to use the word "genocide." Pressure came from the State De-
partment in Washington. They did not want to use the word
"genocide" because it would attract certain international obliga-
tions. That aside, there were many people who simply did not
believe it.
In South Africa, one of the most important gifts from our
Truth and Reconciliation Commission was that it stopped the
denials. Until 1994, the majority of white South Africans pre-
ferred not to believe that these things happened. It was uncom-
fortable to accept that these crimes had been committed in their
name and for their benefit. It was the mass of evidence from
over 21,000 victims and 7000 perpetrators that effectively
stopped the false denials.
Perhaps the best example of ending denials comes from the
Yugoslavia Tribunal. Dragan Erdemovic was a Croatian who
fought in the Serb Army. In his evidence before the Tribunal,
he confessed to having shot and killed at least 70 of the some
8,000 innocent Muslim men and boys slaughtered at Srebrenica
in 1995.22 When the allegations were first aired about the massa-
cre, the Bosnian Serb leaders Karadzic and Mladic denied it.
They said, "This did not happen." When Erdemovic arrived in
The Hague and made public that there was a mass grave, the
response from Pale and the Bosnian Serb Army was, "No, no, we
deny there's a mass grave there; and, if there is, it will contain
the war dead from battles fought years ago. We deny there was a
massacre in 1995 at Srebrenica." When the mass grave was ex-
22. Pre-Trial Transcript of Dragan Erdemovic, May 31, 1996 (ICTY 1996) (IT-96-
22-PT).
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humed forensic medical evidence established that death had oc-
curred on or about the dates of the events in Srebrenica. Virtu-
ally all of them were male, men and boys, all found with their
arms bound and tied behind their back. That is not the way peo-
ple are killed in battle. The denials stopped. In Rwanda, the
mass of evidence that has been meticulously found has estab-
lished beyond question the careful planning that went into the
genocide of April 1994. So these Tribunals are important.
Successes aside, there is an interesting lesson to be learned
from international and local justice in Kosovo. In 1999, the
United Nations Mission, UNMIK, set up a system of international
policing but used only local Kosovo judges in the courts. Very
quickly it became clear that those judges were biased against
Serb defendants and many travesties of justice took place. Only
in 2000, the following year, did UNMIK appoint one interna-
tional judge and one international prosecutor to sit in the court
in Mitrovica. This is a divided city where there are Serbs in the
one half and Muslim Kosovo Albanians in the other. That did
not work because the international judge sat with two other local
judges and was outvoted. The international prosecutors could
hardly even come to grips with the huge caseload that built up.
Eventually, later in 2000, there were hunger strikes by Serb de-
fendants and that led to the appointment of international judges
and prosecutors to serve in all five districts of Kosovo, and one
international judge on the Kosovo Supreme Court. This was still
insufficient. The courts and prosecutors were not acting without
bias. It was only late in 2000 that the United Nations set up
courts in Kosovo that had a majority of international judges.
They were also given the right to re-investigate some cases that
had been improperly abandoned by local prosecutors. This has
been a very frustrating process. If it proves one thing, it is that if
you are going to have a new transitional system in operation, get
it right from the beginning. Do not do it incrementally and in a
way that makes the criminal justice system really fall into disre-
pute. I think that this is an important lesson for the future,
whether in Iraq or anywhere else.
There is a third success of the UN Tribunals. Many people
ask if these two Tribunals have had any deterrent effect. It is
always difficult to prove deterrence. How do you prove what
crimes would have been committed but for a particular court or
but for a particular criminal justice system being in operation?
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But there is anecdotal evidence of deterrence. Prior to the
launch of Operation Storm, the Croatian leadership publicly ac-
knowledged their human rights obligations to civilians. 23 That
notwithstanding, it emerged that the Croatian forces did attack
civilians and did commit war crimes. 24 It is not possible to prove
whether more civilians would have been attacked but for that
awareness that a court in the Hague could hold them to their
word.
More compelling perhaps are the statistics.25 In World War
I, roughly 95% of the casualties were soldiers.2 6 In World War II,
it became 50%.27 World War I was still old-fashioned from a war
point of view, where armies fought armies. In World War II, ar-
mies fought armies but they also fought civilians. Whether it was
the Nazi blitz bombing of London and Coventry, or the fire
bombing of Dresden, Hamburg, and other German cities, or the
dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the
Second World War made innocent civilians the intended victims
of those massive bombing campaigns. And so it was not surpris-
ing that it became 50%. In the Korean War, it became 84% civil-
ian victims. 28 In Vietnam, 90% of the victims were civilian. In
over 200 civil wars since the Second World War, certainly over
90% of the victims have been civilians.29 So this is a horrible
aspect of a bloody second half to the twentieth century.
For the first time, this was reversed by the democracies in
their bombing campaigns in Kosovo. Seventy-eight days of
bombing, massive bombing, claimed under 500 civilian victims.3 0
23. See, e.g., John Pomfret, Battle Could Hasten Long War's Conclusion - On Fighters'
Terms, WASH. POST, Aug. 5. 1995, at Al.
24. Indictment, Prosecutor v. Ivan Cermak & Mladen Markac (ICTY 2004) (IT-03-
73-I).
25. In June 2003, a bill was put before the U.S. Congress that made a finding as to
the precipitous increase in civilian casualties though twentieth century conflicts. See
Women and Children in Conflict Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2536, 108th Cong.
§ 201(1) (2003).
26. See WORKING FOR RECONCILIATION - A CARITAS HANDBOOK at 1 (1999) [herein-
after WORKING FOR RECONCILIATION].
27. Id.
28. See Max Born, What Is Left to Hope For, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Apr. 1964,
at 4.
29. See CHRISTER ALHSTROM, CASUALTIES OF CONFLICT: REPORT FOR THE WORLD
CAMPAIGN FOR THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF WAR (1989). As this report spells out,
"victims" include both those, who are casualties of conflict as well as those displaced.
30. Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 12,
No. 1 (D) (2000).
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This was something new. I do not believe that that would have
been the position but for the work of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. It
is common knowledge that the NATO countries involved had
military lawyers sitting with the military commanders, telling
them what were and were notjustifiable military targets. Civilian
lives were spared. For the first time in modern warfare, certainly
since before the Second World War, there was a great concern to
protect civilians.
In the United States' bombing in Afghanistan of the
Taliban, there was again great publicity given to the orders to
avoid civilian casualties and regret expressed when civilians were
killed in error. It may have been negligence but there was no
intention on the part of the United States Army and Air Force to
target civilians. Their intention was to protect civilians. In Iraq
it was more difficult because of the vicious war on the ground.
Nevertheless, every measure was taken within reason not to at-
tack innocent civilians. This is a success of the Yugoslavia Tribu-
nal and, to an extent, the Rwanda Tribunal. On the other side,
war crimes continue to be committed, whether it is in Africa or
in Asia or in many other parts of the world where that deterrent
effect has not been felt. But a start has been made.
With that background, let me turn to the question as to
what should be done with Saddam Hussein and his lieutenants.
What is hoped to be achieved by their trial? One cannot start
looking for solutions until one identifies the goals.
First and foremost it must surely be to bring justice for the
victims; justice for the hundreds of thousands of victims of geno-
cide and other war crimes committed since 1968 when Saddam
Hussein assumed the leadership of Iraq. Not only victims in Iraq
but one should not leave out of account the many hundreds of
thousands of war crimes committed by Iraq in its war against
Iran. So we are dealing with both domestic and international
crimes.
A second goal must be to bring acknowledgement to the
victims. Why do families of loved ones want a court trial? It is
not to tell them what happened. They know that. They know
the facts. They want an official acknowledgement, a public ac-
knowledgement. It is important and often crucial for the heal-
ing process to begin. From my own observations of the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the healing pro-
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cess of many victims was not possible until they received that
public acknowledgement in front of the television cameras and
the media generally. Obviously not all victims respond in this
way. However, that acknowledgement is important to many vic-
tims cannot be disputed.
Thirdly, a trial of Saddam Hussein should serve as a deter-
rent, at least in the Middle East. If this sort of war criminal is put
on trial, it must have a positive effect. I have no doubt that some
leaders in the world and particularly in the Middle East may be
deterred from committing terrible war crimes in the future.
Those seem to me to be the most important goals to be
achieved by bringing Saddam Hussein and his lieutenants to jus-
tice. It is hardly necessary to say that revenge by the United
States should be the last reason for putting Saddam Hussein on
trial.
The goals I have mentioned cannot be achieved unless the
trial is both in fact and in perception scrupulously fair. You can-
not provide that acknowledgement and bring justice to the vic-
tims unless they believe that the process has been a fair one. A
fair trial, in turn, cannot be held unless there is adequate secur-
ity for the judges, the defendants, the witnesses, and counsel,
both prosecution and defense. A fair trial cannot be held if the
judges are not independent and are not competent. A fair trial
cannot be held in the absence of meticulous preparation by the
prosecution and competent defense counsel.
One of the early problems that I had as Chief Prosecutor for
the Yugoslavia Tribunal was my concern for adequate defense
for Tadic, the first war criminal we put on trial. At that time, the
United Nations was not prepared to pay for more than one de-
fense counsel for an accused. So a list was drawn up and given to
Mr. Tadic in the U.N. prison outside The Hague. Tadic looked
down the list, saw what looked like a Russian name, Mikhail
Vladimiroff, and he thought that would be a good idea because a
Russian would be pro-Serb. Mr. Vladimiroff, however, did not
speak a word of Russian. His grandfather had immigrated to the
Netherlands. Fortunately, Mr. Vladimiroff was a most compe-
tent criminal lawyer practicing in The Hague. The judges, how-
ever, had decided on an adversarial, common law kind of trial,
where cross-examination was essential. Mr. Vladimiroff had
never cross-examined in his life, because on the continent you
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do not have cross-examination; the judges run the trial and ask
the questions. Mr. Vladimiroff realized that he would not have
been able to manage.
At about that time, I received a visit in The Hague from
Mark Ellis, who was then the founding director of the American
Bar Association's Eastern and Central European Law Initiative
("CEELI"). He asked me how the American Bar Association
could help me, the Prosecutor. I said the best way the Ameri-
can Bar could help the Prosecutor was to provide adequate de-
fense for the defendants. That appealed to him. To cut a long
story short, the ABA hired two British barristers from the crimi-
nal bar and they joined Vladimiroff and conducted the cross-
examination of the witnesses. But for that, Tadic's trial would
not have been a fair one. He would have had to rely on a com-
pletely inexperienced counsel.
It is very important that Saddam Hussein should be offered
a competent and adequate defense team. Of course, there
might be a problem if Saddam Hussein takes a leaf out of the
Milosevic book and decides to be his own attorney.
Let me add that it would be a great shame if anger or haste
or politics were allowed to dictate these decisions. If the haste to
get a trial is going to be the yardstick, then it is going to be a
hopeless situation. I was recently on a panel on a BBC World
Radio program on this topic. The other two members of the
panel were the Political Editor of the London Times and a minis-
ter in the new Governing Council in Baghdad. The Iraqi minis-
ter was asked by a very bright interviewer on the BBC how the
trial should look. The Minister was adamant. He said that Sad-
dam Hussein has to be brought to trial in front of Iraqi judges in
Baghdad, which must be done soon and that the trial must be
swift. He said that Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to use it
as a platform for propaganda. The interviewer responded by
asking whether that would that be consistent with a fair trial.
The minister said that it was not really a relevant question be-
cause the people of Iraq have already condemned Saddam Hus-
sein. They have already found him guilty. I could not help but
intervene and said, "Well, that includes the judges." There was
no response. But of course that is the problem with this sort of
victors' justice.
Given the situation in Iraq at the moment, to put on a trial
2004] 1505
1506 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:1322
in Baghdad today is just beyond any thought. How can you have
a trial with bombs going off daily, people being attacked daily?
How can you expect a court to sit in Baghdad and be able to
operate and have a fair trial? Moreover, there have been no in-
dependent courts sitting in Iraq since 1968. For thirty-five years
there have been no regular courts sitting. There are, I under-
stand, a handful of judges who are still there who were judges'
before 1968. They may be appropriate. I do not know enough
about them to be able to comment but certainly there cannot be
more than a tiny pool of judges who may qualify. Then, there
have been no independent prosecutors in Iraq for thirty-five
years. I certainly have not heard of any pool of independent
prosecutors who are available.
One has got to have courts sitting in judgment over Saddam
Hussein that will have the respect and confidence of all of the
people of Iraq. It is no use appealing to only one sector, either
for Saddam Hussein or against Saddam Hussein. That is not the
sort of trial that is going to achieve any of the goals to which I
have referred.
With the United States' assistance, some of these problems
may be solved. If this court is in fact or in perception a front for
the United States, that is obviously going to be self-destructive. It
is not going to bring any substantial justice to the victims. And
the international community, certainly outside the United States
and possibly the United Kingdom, is simply going to reject it. It
would be a recipe for failure.
If there are local judges in Iraq who would be appropriate, I
do not see that they can be appointed until there is an indepen-
dent and hopefully democratic government to appoint them.
Judges appointed by an American appointed governing council
will not earn the confidence or respect of the broad public in
Iraq or anywhere else in the region. It would be shameful if the
trial of Saddam Hussein was left open to the criticism of being
victors' justice.
It follows that there cannot be a fair trial in this situation
without international involvement. By all means use Iraqi
judges. If the security situation allows it, by all means, and that is
the first prize, hold the trial in Baghdad. I doubt whether that is
practical politics in the coming year or two. I hope I am wrong.
If I am wrong, I will be very happy that a situation obtains in
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Baghdad where a trial can be held there that will be fair, that
competent defense counsel and witnesses will feel secure in put-
ting up a defense for Saddam Hussein and that prosecutors and
judges will feel secure in conducting their work.
Clearly, the most sensible route would be for the United
States to request the Security Council to set up an international
court for Iraq and clearly, they have the competence to do it. If
the United States requested it, there can be no question that all
of the Members, the Permanent Members and the Non-Perma-
nent Members, would go along with it. It would be sensible be-
cause it would have the appearance and the fact of being inde-
pendent. The present United States Administration could en-
sure that all of their fears about international courts are
resolved. The United States could require the Security Council
itself to select the judges and prosecutors. With the exercise of
its veto, the United States could certainly ensure that judges and
prosecutors do not come from inappropriate countries. But that
is not going to happen because the Bush Administration will
have no truck with any international court.
The outcome is in the power of the United States. Saddam
Hussein is in their custody and they cannot be compelled to
hand him over for a trial that is notjust and fair. I would suggest
that they should not hand him over for trial to any court which
does not meet the standards for which this country has stood:
looking after the interests of victims and witnesses and the appli-
cation of the rule of law and fair and due process.
A third alternative is a hybrid domestic tribunal, the Sierra
Leone or Lockerbie type of tribunal. Again, if that is done, as in
Sierra Leone, the U.N. involvement would be essential as you
cannot have independent courts being set up in this situation by
'the United States or even by the present Governing Council.
Where should the court sit? Ideally it should be in Iraq and if
not in Iraq, as close as possible to Iraq. I am not sufficiently
acquainted with the possibilities in the region, but clearly there
are good judges from the Islamic world who could be brought
into the process, with or without Iraqi judges. There are compe-
tent and experienced judges in Egypt, in the Emirates, and else-
where in the region.
What should Americans do about it? What should you do
about it? Americans should pressure their government to take
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all necessary steps to ensure a fair trial. Surely that is not too
much to ask of the American government. I would have thought
not many years ago that it would have been too obvious even to
debate that there should be a fair trial in a situation where the
United States is calling the shots.
The strength of democracy is that if there are enough of
you, you can make a difference. That is why the Bush Adminis-
tration changed the rules for military commissions. I have no
doubt that it is only because of protests from within the United
States community. The American Bar, the Association of the Bar
of New York, and many other groups, including human rights
organizations, were all horrified at the rules that were first
promulgated in November of 2001 and they were drastically
amended in March of the following year. The later rules may
not meet the demands of human rights activists but they are in-
comparably more appropriate and conducive of fair trials.
There appears to be little media concern about a fair trial
for Saddam Hussein. What you say does make a difference and I
suggest it is something about which you should speak out.
Let me conclude by repeating that the decision with regard
to these issues is very much in the hands of the United States.
Saddam Hussein is in their custody and they should not hand
him over for trial unless satisfied that that trial will comply with
the standards to which I have referred. Those are the standards
in respect of which the United States, historically and tradition-
ally, has been justifiably proud and for which it has been ad-
mired by the democratic world.
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